What exactly does
state security do?
The criminal defence lawyer between intelligence services, informants and prosecution
State security is a specialist area within the police authorities (police state security). It also encompasses the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and its state counterparts, as well as the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) and Military Counterintelligence Service (MAD). Its official task is to protect the state's essential constitutional core – the free democratic basic order, sovereignty, security and continued existence of the Federal Republic of Germany and its states – against anti-constitutional activity, extremism, espionage, sabotage and politically motivated crime.
As a criminal defence lawyer, I have extensive experience with state security offences, which, when classified as serious, are heard by the state security divisions of the higher regional courts. Regional courts have state security chambers, but charges for less serious state security offences can also be brought before a local court.
I also have experience with something constitutional protection officers are particularly fond of: using informants, so-called trusted persons, or undercover investigators. In December 2017, my client was arrested with brutal force in the street because he had allegedly planned an attack on Karlsruhe's Christmas market. An hour earlier, he had been at a police station reporting someonewhom he himself suspected of planning an attack on Karlsruhe's Christmas market. What he did not know was that this person was an informant for the State Criminal Police Office (LKA). At the trial before the Higher Regional Court in Stuttgart-Stammheim, it emerged that this person had numerous previous convictions, including fraud, and was entirely unreliable. My client was acquitted of the informant's allegation. It is safe to assume that the scoundrel who falsely incriminated him is once again, and still, working for the LKA in the interests of our ‘security’.
State security often finances, with taxpayers' money, the very structures it claims to combat. Particularly in the far-right milieu, payments to informants enabled neo-Nazi groups to function in the first place. But in left-wing and autonomous circles too, the entanglement of undercover investigators, as in the cases of ‘Maria B.’ or ‘Iris P.’ in Berlin, and state infiltration demonstrates that state security does not merely observe the political field, but actively shapes it, in order to divide, neutralise or criminalise movements.
In reality, state security is not neutral. Its work has traditionally been skewed. While left-wing and anti-racist structures – from autonomous centres and climate protest camps to anti-fascist research groups and even bookshops – have for decades been extensively infiltrated by informants, monitored and subjected to organised crime and terrorism provisions such as section 129(a) StGB, neo-Nazi networks operated for years under the ‘lone actor’ label or were shielded by official failure: the NSU complex and countless discoveries of weapons and ammunition in police and prepper chat groups. This is not an oversight, but systemic: state security reacts sensitively when property relations, infrastructure or the monopoly on force are directly challenged. Racism and fascism, by contrast, are often taken seriously as threats only when they embarrass the state itself, while the everyday reality of far-right violence is played down by the authorities. Could that have something to do with the officers' own thinking? Shame on anyone who thinks ill of it.
State security operates as a political filter. Social conflicts – demonstrations over rents, strikes, expropriation campaigns or climate activism – are depoliticised through the authorities' lens and translated into the language of domestic security. Legitimate social opposition becomes ‘crime’ or even ‘extremist activity’.
People protesting against coal excavators quickly end up in preventive police databases. Those resisting neighbourhood gentrification are framed as ‘militant’; those demanding universal application of international law are branded ‘antisemitic’. State security performs a disciplinary function here: it defines the limits of what can be ‘said’ and ‘done’, and penalises departures from the rules of everyday parliamentary-capitalist life.
What state security seems to overlook when lumping the right and left together:
Advocating a socialist, democratic society does not violate the Basic Law.
The fact that the Basic Law does not prescribe a particular economic order, such as capitalism or the social market economy, and therefore leaves room for socialist elements or a socialist economic order follows from the principle of the ‘Basic Law's neutrality in economic policy’ and from specific constitutional provisions.
The principal legal and constitutional-historical foundations are:
1. Federal Constitutional Court case law: neutrality in economic policy
In its early leading judgements, particularly the Investment Aid judgement (BVerfGE 4, 7) of 1954 and the Co-determination judgement (BVerfGE 50, 290) of 1979, the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) made clear that the Basic Law is neutral in matters of economic policy.
- The framers of the constitution deliberately did not choose a particular economic system.
- The legislature may pursue any economic policy it considers appropriate, provided it respects fundamental rights and the rule of law. Although the social market economy is the Federal Republic's historically developed reality, it is not constitutionally mandatory.
2. Article 15 of the Basic Law: socialisation / transfer to common ownership
Perhaps the clearest evidence in the constitutional text itself is Article 15 GG. It reads, in part:
‘Land, natural resources and means of production may, for the purpose of socialisation, be transferred to public ownership or other forms of a publicly controlled economy by a law determining the nature and extent of compensation.’
The Basic Law thus expressly permits entire economic sectors and central means of production to be transferred from private to common ownership – a classic core element of socialist economic theory – provided this is done by law and against compensation.
3. Article 14(2) and (3) GG: the social obligations of property
Although Article 14(1) GG protects private property, the following paragraphs qualify it substantially:
- Article 14(2) GG: ‘Property entails obligations. Its use shall also serve the public good.’ Private property is not an absolute, unlimited right under the Basic Law, but is permanently subject to the public interest.
- Article 14(3) GG: Permits expropriation for the public good.
4. The welfare state principle: Articles 20(1) and 28(1) GG
The Basic Law defines the Federal Republic as a ‘democratic and social federal state’. This welfare state principle obliges the state to ensure social justice, essential public services and a balancing of social inequalities. It legitimises extensive state intervention in markets, redistribution and public direction of the economy.
Advocating racism and ethno-nationalist ideology violates the Basic Law.
Promoting racism and ethno-nationalist ideology is irreconcilable with the foundations of the Basic Law. While the constitution is open in economic policy, it draws an absolute, unchangeable line at human dignity and the equality of all people.
The unconstitutionality of racist and ethno-nationalist activity follows from these core principles and provisions:
1. The inviolability of human dignity: Article 1(1) GG
The Basic Law's highest constitutional principle is that the dignity of every individual is inviolable.
- Incompatibility with racism: Racist ideologies divide people into ‘superior’ and ‘inferior’ groups according to biological, ethnic or cultural characteristics. They thereby deny certain groups an equal claim to social worth and respect – a direct attack on the core of human dignity.
- The eternity clause: Article 79(3) GG: Article 1 GG is protected even against constitutional amendment by the so-called eternity clause. Abolishing universal human dignity in favour of an ethno-nationalist order is legally impossible under the Basic Law in any circumstances.
2. General equality and the prohibition of discrimination: Article 3 GG
Article 3(1) GG guarantees everyone's equality before the law. Article 3(3) GG gives this concrete form through a strict prohibition on distinctions: no one may be disadvantaged or favoured because of their descent, race, language, homeland and origin, faith, or religious or political views.
- A policy tying rights, participation or citizenship status to ethnic affiliation directly violates this constitutional prohibition on discrimination.
3. The people as a community of citizens, not ancestry: Article 20(2) GG
The Basic Law's democratic principle, ‘All state authority emanates from the people’, defines ‘the people’ strictly in terms of citizenship (demos), not ethnic or biological descent (ethnos).
- The Federal Constitutional Court made unequivocally clear in its decisions, particularly the 2017 NPD prohibition judgement (BVerfGE 144, 20), that an ethno-nationalist conception of the people seeking to exclude people from the citizenry because of their ethnic origin or assign them lesser legal status as ‘second-class citizens’ is incompatible with the free democratic basic order.
4. A democracy capable of defending itself: Articles 9(2), 18 and 21(2) GG
The Basic Law was deliberately created as a constitutional counter-model to National Socialism. It grants no freedom to abolish freedom:
- Bans on associations and parties: Associations under Article 9(2) GG and political parties under Article 21(2) GG that oppose the constitutional order or international understanding, or seek to undermine or abolish the free democratic basic order, are unconstitutional or may be banned.
- Limits to freedom of expression: Article 5(2) GG: Freedom of expression also protects misguided or harsh criticism, but ends where incitement to hatred under section 130 StGB or racist denigration disturbs public peace and violates others' human dignity; see also the Federal Constitutional Court's Wunsiedel judgement, BVerfGE 124, 300.
This seems beyond state security's grasp. Year after year, right-wing extremism, left-wing extremism and Islamism appear as three equivalent categories in constitutional protection reports. Nor are they weighted differently. Anyone supporting Rote Hilfe is, in the constitutional protection service's eyes, just as suspect of being an enemy of the state as a member of the Identitarian Movement.
The development of state surveillance since Edward Snowden
Edward Snowden has to hide in Russia from American prosecution. If the German state were serious about fundamental rights, it would grant him asylum and award him the Federal Cross of Merit. What Snowden exposed is already history:
State surveillance has reached new dimensions:
Modern state security concepts, such as the police's comprehensive data management, long since digitised by 2026, focus less and less on investigating specific crimes and more and more on preventive justice. They concern preliminary investigations, data screening, mobile cell-site enquiries at every major protest and retention of movement data. This is the creeping establishment of a preventive surveillance state in which citizens fall under blanket suspicion as soon as they move beyond state-tolerated paths.
State security has evolved from a reactive prosecuting authority into a preventive surveillance and preliminary-investigation structure. Specific legislative reforms and police practice demonstrate this.
Preventive surveillance
1. Digital infrastructure: ‘Polizei 2020’ and Palantir software (hessenDATA / VeRA)
- Evidence of comprehensive data management: Through the federal–state programme ‘Polizei 2020’, the entire IT architecture of German police forces, including BKA and LKA state security departments, is being standardised and brought together in a shared data system. The aim is access within seconds to personal data, case files, movement profiles and social media analyses across state borders.
- Automated data analysis (data mining): States such as Hesse (hessenDATA), North Rhine-Westphalia (DAR) and Bavaria (VeRA) use software solutions such as those supplied by US company Palantir to link data from entirely different sources automatically: registration records, number-plate recognition, mobile cells, social networks and police databases.
- Constitutional confirmation: The Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) examined precisely this practice in its leading judgement of 16 February 2023 (case 1 BvR 1547/19 and others) and declared it partly unconstitutional. The court found that automated data analysis substantially interferes with the fundamental right to informational self-determination because linking individually harmless pieces of data targets people without any specific suspicion of an offence.
2. The constitutional shift into the preliminary stage: the BKA Act and police laws
- Lowering intervention thresholds: In recent years, the Federal Criminal Police Office Act (BKAG) and almost all state police laws, such as Bavaria's PAG or North Rhine-Westphalia's Police Act, have been reformed. Central concepts such as a ‘specific danger’ have been replaced by constructs such as ‘impending danger’ or ‘potential threat actor’.
- Consequence: State security no longer has to wait until a crime is planned or prepared. An official prediction that someone mightcommit a serious offence in future is sufficient to order intrusive measures such as remote computer searches, interception at source using state spyware, long-term surveillance or exclusion orders.
3. Shared state security databases, such as ‘Left-wing violent offenders’ / RADAR-iTE
- Storage without individual suspicion: State security uses shared databases, such as Politically motivated crime – left-wing or the former Left-wing violent offendersdatabase. People are often entered merely because their identity was checked during a demonstration – even if the subsequent investigation was discontinued or ended in an acquittal.
- Assessment frameworks: RADAR systems: Using systems such as RADAR-iTE for the Islamist field and corresponding developments for political cases, people are placed in risk categories through standardised questionnaires and biographical characteristics – a classic instrument of preventive risk prediction rather than conventional proof.
4. Mass mobile cell-site enquiries and preliminary measures at protests
- Practice at climate protests and summits: Particularly in connection with protests, such as around Hamburg's G20 summit, in Hambach Forest, in Lützerath or during actions by Last Generation, parliamentary questions and court proceedings, including before Munich I Regional Court and the Federal Constitutional Court, revealed extensive use by state security departments of mobile cell-site enquiries, bank account enquiries and preventive detention.
- Applying section 129 StGB: forming criminal organisations: Lawyers and civil rights organisations, such as the Society for Civil Rights or the Republican Lawyers' Association, criticise state security's increasing use of section 129 StGB as an ‘investigation provision’. Mere initial suspicion of a criminal organisation opens the entire arsenal of covert surveillance – telecommunications interception, bugging and observation – against whole political groups, even if there are often barely any viable indictments for specific individual offences at the end.
Targeted by state security investigators?
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