My position

Why I am a criminal defence lawyer

Whom I defend. And whom I do not.

‘Defence is a fight,’ writes Hans Dahs at the beginning of his Handbook for Criminal Defence Lawyers. A fight for the rights of the accused against a state that deploys its most powerful instruments in criminal proceedings. Instruments of repression.

That is why I defend.

Criminal defence means insisting that the state obey its own rules. Especially when the accused stands alone, the public has long since passed judgement, the justice system is blindly heading for a conviction or hardly anyone still asks about their rights.

The accused faces a state apparatus with police, prosecutors, courts and considerable coercive powers. It can place people under surveillance, search them, arrest them and lock them up. It can destroy their livelihood and ruin their reputation long before any judgement is delivered.

Criminal law is organised state repression. It is necessary in a state governed by the rule of law, but it remains repression. And it always carries the risk of abuse of power, excess and arbitrariness. Not just when the state knowingly acts unjustly. Also when investigators are convinced of their own theory, prosecutors see only incriminating evidence and judges have inwardly settled on a verdict long ago.

This power needs a counterweight. A defence lawyer who does not plead for understanding for the accused, but demands their rights. Who objects where objection is necessary. Who becomes inconvenient when taking the easy way would come at the client's expense. And who, if necessary, takes on the justice system with considerable force.

The instruments sharpened in criminal proceedings against supposedly deserving targets are not confined to them. The knife sharpened against the right today can be turned against the left tomorrow. Anyone defending freedom and due process must not ask who benefits.


Criminal law is wide-ranging, and legislators are fond of repeatedly making it harsher.

If this continues, eventually everything will carry ‘life imprisonment’.

The executive takes prosecution in some areas extremely seriously:

State security offences, and those treated as such, receive the highest priority – at least when they are attributed to the left.

The scourge of fare evasion is also met with great severity, as is benefit fraud. After all, both offences contradict the so-called merit principle, which the ruling class has made the measure of all things.

The state also takes a dim view of antisemitism. That is welcome in principle, since Germany bears a particular responsibility because of its history. Yet when the number of so-called antisemitic offences rises year after year, this need not necessarily reflect growing hostility towards Jews; it may instead be because the concept of antisemitism is being stretched too far.

With tax evasion, by contrast, the executive takes a rather relaxed approach to prosecution.

And when the German Federal Chancellor publicly endorses a war of aggression that violates international law with the words ‘doing the dirty work’, the authorities turn a completely blind eye. The police seem to consider it more important to prosecute ‘Merz, lick my balls’.

Precisely because state prosecution is not neutral but strikes selectively, a determined defence is needed. The only question is: for whom?

For a long time, my principle was therefore: I defend everyone. Just as a doctor treats everyone.

That is why I also defended Nazis. Not because I shared their convictions, but because they too were accused persons – and because the rule of law must prove its worth precisely in how it treats its opponents.

That principle has not changed. Nazis too are entitled to a fair trial and an effective defence. Even the worst beliefs do not extinguish those rights. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply only to likeable people. And the presumption of innocence does not apply only to those whose innocence we would like to believe in.

What has changed is the personal conclusion I draw from it.

Ten years ago, I saw the far right as a contemptible political fringe, but not as a major threat. Today, I see a real threat to liberal democracy: from organised far-right extremists, violent networks and an AfD in which authoritarian, ethno-nationalist and anti-democratic forces have gained considerable influence.

I cannot and will not disregard this development in my professional decisions.

That is why I no longer defend Nazis. Or far-right extremists. Or proto-fascists from the AfD.

The right to a defence lawyer is not a right to any particular defence lawyer – and certainly not a right to me. I no longer place my experience, my labour and my voice at the disposal of people whose political aim is to damage or abolish an open society and its institutions.

But I have also become more selective beyond political convictions.

Criminal defence is not a job you do on the side. Certainly not as I understand it. A case can take months or years of my life. It demands commitment, passion and sometimes considerable personal sacrifice. It requires a willingness to engage in conflict, overcome resistance and, if necessary, confront an entire apparatus of justice.

That energy is not unlimited. And I no longer want to waste it on just anyone.

I can choose which side I stand on. And I do.

I may find someone suspected of murder likeable. Someone accused in a relatively trivial case may be a person I want nothing to do with. The seriousness of the allegation says little about someone's personality. And an allegation is far from proof of an offence.

Of course personal sympathy matters. Why should it not? I have to work with my clients, listen to them and be able to trust them. Not blindly, but enough to make a workable relationship possible. I do not have to approve of what they have done. I do not even have to like them. But I must be prepared to commit all my strength to their defence. That is easier when I see my client as someone I want to fight for.

There are qualities and behaviours I find repellent. I do not want to fight for people who treat others' sexual autonomy lightly.

I see no contradiction in that. The rights of an accused person depend neither on their character nor on my sympathy. Whether I personally want to be their defence lawyer is a different question.

I defend because state power needs scrutiny. Criminal law is repressive by its very nature. It permits the state to interfere with an individual's freedom with extreme severity. To prevent that power becoming excessive, it needs resistance.

Criminal defence is that resistance.