Sabra and Shatila

The massacre of Palestinians under the Israeli army's eyes.

From 16 to 18 September 1982, Lebanese Christian militiamen carried out a massacre in the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila in Beirut. Israel made it possible.

When the armed forces of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) left Beirut in early September 1982, the people of Sabra and Shatila were left without their previous protection. Security guarantees had been promised for the Palestinian civilian population. Yet the international protection forces left Beirut before their safety was assured.

Following the assassination of Lebanese president-elect Bachir Gemayel, the Israeli army occupied West Beirut, surrounded the refugee camps and allowed Lebanese Christian militiamen to enter. They murdered and abducted unarmed civilians. Israeli forces controlled access and illuminated the camps at night with flares, but did not intervene in time.

Israel's then defence minister, Ariel Sharon, was among those responsible. The Israeli Kahan Commission, established afterwards, found him personally responsible for failing to prevent the massacre.

In June 1982, the Israeli army invaded Lebanon under Defence Minister Ariel Sharon. Its declared aim was to combat the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), which was conducting military operations against Israel from Lebanon.

Israeli forces advanced as far as Beirut and besieged the western part of the city, where the PLO headquarters were located. Weeks of fighting and Israeli bombardment caused numerous civilian casualties.

An agreement was eventually reached through American mediation: the PLO's armed units would leave Beirut. In return, the safety of the remaining Palestinian civilian population was to be guaranteed.

That was the crucial question.

Tens of thousands of Palestinian refugees lived in Beirut. Many had been expelled from their homeland in 1948 or were descendants of those refugees.

The PLO's armed units also protected the Palestinian population in the refugee camps against hostile militias.

The danger of revenge attacks was obvious. Palestinian organisations and Lebanese Christian militias had fought one another for years during the Lebanese civil war.

The PLO therefore demanded security guarantees for the civilians who would remain.

The United States brokered corresponding assurances. An international force of American, French and Italian soldiers was to accompany the withdrawal and contribute to security.

The withdrawal of PLO fighters from Beirut was completed on 1 September 1982.

But only days later, the international protection forces also left the city. They had withdrawn completely by 13 September.

The Palestinian refugees were left behind – without the PLO's armed forces and without the international force on whose protection they had relied.

On 14 September 1982, Bachir Gemayel, Lebanon's elected president and leader of the Christian Phalange, was assassinated in a bombing.

The Phalange and allied Lebanese Christian militias were allied with Israel. Gemayel's death heightened the already existing danger of retaliation against Palestinians.

The following day, the Israeli army occupied West Beirut. It also surrounded Sabra and Shatila and controlled the principal access points.

On 16 September, the Israeli military leadership allowed armed units of the Lebanese Christian militias to enter the camps.

Officially, they were to find Palestinian fighters remaining there.

In reality, they encountered a largely defenceless civilian population whose armed protectors had already left Beirut.

What followed was not a military confrontation between armed opponents.

Militiamen entered homes, shot the occupants, killed people with knives and axes, and raped women and girls. Those murdered included infants, small children, pregnant women and elderly people.

Children were killed in front of their parents. Families were dragged from their homes. Unarmed men were rounded up, bound and shot.

The United Nations Secretary-General's September 1982 report documents the observations of UN staff who found numerous groups of bodies in the camps: men, women and children in civilian clothes, apparently murdered together in groups of ten or twenty.

UN report on Sabra and Shatila, 18 September 1982

Foreign doctors and nurses working at Gaza Hospital in Beirut also reported on the seriously injured civilians brought in during the massacre.

British surgeon Dr Swee Chai Ang worked at the hospital during these events. In an open letter written as early as 1 October 1982, she described treating the victims, destroyed homes and the suffering of the surviving women and children.

Eyewitness account by Dr Swee Chai Ang, October 1982

Hostage-taking and the disappearance of hundreds

The violence was not confined to the murders committed on the spot.

Residents were rounded up by armed militiamen, held hostage and taken out of the camps. Men were separated from women and children. Captives were shot in front of other residents.

Numerous people were taken away on lorries. Many never returned. Their fate has still not been conclusively established.

The eyewitness account Sabra and Shatila 1982: Resisting the Massacre describes, among other things, armed militiamen driving hostages through the camps, separating men from women and children, and shooting several captives in front of the remaining residents.

Eyewitness account by Zakaria al-Shaikh – Institute for Palestine Studies

Through years of research, historian Bayan Nuwayhed al-Hout reconstructed the names of 1,390 victims. They included 906 confirmed dead and 484 people who were abducted or disappeared.

These figures include only cases documented by name. They do not represent the massacre's true scale.

The exact number of people murdered can no longer be established.

This is partly because many bodies were buried in mass graves, others remained beneath the rubble of destroyed homes, and numerous abducted people never reappeared.

The substantially higher victim estimates are based on independent historical research, survivors' testimony and reconstruction of deaths and disappearances.

Palestinian historian Bayan Nuwayhed al-Hout conducted extensive field research between 1982 and 1984. She interviewed relatives and survivors, examined victim lists and reconstructed the fate of numerous families. Her study estimates a possible total of around 3,500 dead.

Bayan Nuwayhed al-Hout: Sabra and Shatila: September 1982 (Pluto Press, 2004)

The Palestinian Red Crescent estimated that more than 2,000people were killed.

Journalist Amnon Kapeliouk used contemporary documents, recovered bodies and other evidence to reconstruct a possible total of 3,000 to 3,500 dead.

Institute for Middle East Understanding – compilation of victim figures and their sources

The Institute for Palestine Studies also describes Sabra and Shatila as a massacre of more than 3,000 Palestinian and Lebanese civilians.

Institute for Palestine Studies: Sabra and Shatila, 16–18 September 1982

The estimates differ, and the exact number remains uncertain. But the high figures are not mere assertions. They are based on historical research, lists of missing persons and witness testimony.

This concerns thousands of people killed or disappeared. Unarmed civilians left unprotected after the PLO's withdrawal.

During the massacre, the Israeli army stood immediately outside the camps.

It controlled access, had enabled the militias to enter and maintained a forward command post close by.

And it illuminated the area.

While militiamen murdered people in Sabra and Shatila, the Israeli army fired flares that lit the area at night.

As children, women and unarmed men were murdered, Israeli flares illuminated the refugee camps.

The Israeli military leadership received reports of civilians being murdered while the massacre was still taking place.

Nevertheless, it initially allowed the militias to continue.

These events are documented independently of the later Israeli investigation as well. Using American and Israeli government records, historian Seth Anziska examined how Israeli decision-makers supported the militias and how events unfolded under the Israeli army's eyes.

Seth Anziska: Sabra and Shatila: New Revelations on U.S. and Israeli Complicity in Lebanese Massacre, New York Review of Books, 2018

The direct perpetrators were members of Lebanese Christian militias.

But the massacre did not occur independently of Israel's occupation of West Beirut.

Israel had fought the PLO militarily and declared its withdrawal an objective. The PLO's departure removed an essential source of protection for Palestinian refugees.

The danger of retaliation by Lebanese Christian militias was known. After Bachir Gemayel's assassination, it was particularly acute.

Nevertheless, the Israeli military leadership allowed the militias to enter the refugee camps.

It controlled the surrounding area, secured access and supported the operation with night-time illumination.

When reports of civilians being murdered arrived, it did not end the operation immediately.

The Israeli Kahan Commission established later found indirect responsibility on Israel's part and personal responsibility on Ariel Sharon's. But knowledge of Israel's role is by no means based on that investigation alone. It is supported by accounts from survivors, foreign doctors, journalists, UN observers and historical research.

Israel had military control and the ability to intervene against the massacre. Those responsible should have recognised the danger. They did not prevent the massacre.

The United Nations Security Council unanimously condemned the massacre on 19 September 1982.

UN Security Council, Resolution 521 (1982)

In Resolution 37/123 D of 16 December 1982, the United Nations General Assembly described the massacre as an act of genocide.

UN General Assembly, Resolution 37/123 D

Sabra and Shatila demonstrate the devastation caused when an unprotected civilian population is delivered into the hands of armed militias and the military power controlling the area fails to intervene effectively to protect it.

The victims were people who had already lost their homeland. They lived as refugees in a foreign country. When the PLO left Beirut, international guarantees were supposed to ensure their safety.

Only two weeks later, thousands had been murdered or disappeared. They included children who had nothing to do with the Lebanese civil war, the PLO or the military confrontations.

Anyone discussing the history of violence in the Middle East conflict must not omit Sabra and Shatila.

Remembering the victims of 7 October 2023 and remembering those of Sabra and Shatila are not mutually exclusive. A Palestinian child's life is worth no less than an Israeli child's.

Human rights and international humanitarian law apply universally. They must not depend on who the victims and perpetrators are.